肖鋼督爆李克強經濟之人造A股大牛市 (搞活股市, 讓債務嚴俊而借不到銀行錢的企業可到股市融資激活經濟生產力保七, 推動互聯網加.....) 的掠水天仙局!
是刻意有心? 還是超級矇笨? 後知後覺加唔知唔覺的中證鑑主席肖鋼, 拾哈拾哈竟在絕不適當的時機用不合適的手段去盲拆場外融券減槓桿, 就督爆了李克強經濟之人造A股長牛市 (搞活股市, 讓債務嚴俊而借不到銀行錢的企業可到股市融資激活經濟生產力保七, 推動互聯網加......) 的掠水天仙局! 更加上另一罪臣, 留學北朝鮮純北朝鮮思維的張德江先前的騰籠趕鳥(把大量珠三角工廠趕去越南,泰國,柬埔塞 = 把鄧小平,朱鎔基築建的輕工業基礎連根拔起!=毒害中國經濟根基!東筦工廠十室八空,夜夜笙歌不再) (http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/financeestate/art/20150829/19274430) (強國曾有傳說,
當年張受江澤民旨意把粵拉後腿好讓其江浙地盤金庫有較佳競爭力發財) 政績, 就合力炸散朱鎔基築成世界工廠的中國當代經濟盛世, 把中國經濟推入長久陷衰退期! 那麼習近平的一路一帶還會有人信嗎? 一路一帶還能推嗎?
請看:〈蕭遙遊〉2015-08-24 b, c
www.youtube.com/watch?v=nkh6asQMNMc&index=2&list=PLPY0_ooDN1du85pbM2mEaVRE-dS-fHtT3
www.youtube.com/watch?v=XXVY0vbXxfc&index=3&list=PLPY0_ooDN1du85pbM2mEaVRE-dS-fHtT3
七十年代鄧小平改革開放主旨在 "大鑊飯制改為承包制=責任制經濟, 及開放自由受顧工作=解放人力的束縛=減少浪費人力資源", 但鄧小平未能改革價挌及資產所有權制度而導至通漲嚴酷.
幸而朱鎔基當上總理, 用朱鎔基經濟策略成功打做出二十年來中國最強經濟時代: 朱鎔基經濟政策成功在於:
(1) 嚴控貨幣供應:
自已兼任人行行長, 只准按外匯增加量而增發人民幣, 人行絕不買政府債券, 成功控制了通漲回落,
(2) 國退民進:
國企退出大部份輕工業, 而讓民營及中外合資發輝靈活性及責任性改善競爭力而搞活輕工業成為中國經濟興旺火車頭, 不但可發輝勞工勞動力更創出巨額出囗創匯的"中國世界工廠"時代.
(3) 成功加入世貿而做成關稅減免,
提升出囗競爭力, 促進經濟和生產力的自由流動, 改善產銷成本.
今次肖鋼燃點起的A股股災, 而眾金融庸官無能無力, 朿手無策, 加上另一罪臣, 留學北朝鮮純北朝鮮思維的張德江先前的騰籠趕鳥(把大量珠三角工廠趕去越南,泰國,柬埔塞=把鄧小平,朱鎔基築建的輕工業基礎連根拔起! = 毒害中國經濟根基!東筦工廠十室八空,夜夜笙歌不再) (http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/financeestate/art/20150829/19274430) (強國曾有傳說, 當年張受江澤民旨意把粵拉後腿好讓其江浙地盤金庫有較佳競爭力發財) 政績, 就合力炸散朱鎔基築成世界工廠的中國當代經濟盛世, 把中國經濟推入長久陷衰退期! 那麼習近平的一路一帶還會有人信嗎? 一路一帶還能推嗎?
當年溫家寶指揮不動官兵四川地震救災. 今次歷史又証明了, 李克強 (全無金融市場操作知識) 只能裝胸作勢, 雖貴為總理卻完全指揮不動當今在位的各路貪腐金融庸官(及其背後的利益財團)體系.
李克強要求暴力救市(大夾淡倉)是既要狠狠教訓做市沽空的大鱷莊家(警示金融海盜咪在我睇的場呃騙), 也要保著股民對中央政府的信譽(不竟早前央媒還倡導人民入市), 但各路貪腐金融庸官(及其背後的利益財團) 各有私下利益盤算,
陽奉陰為擠牙膏式扮救市; 或是預早在低位先行買入, 等國家救市隊掃高時高價派給國家救市隊! 反正國家救市隊的操盤手中有自家馬仔, 刮噬食盡每次擠牙膏式國家救市隊掃高的人做升浪. 或是拿了公帑就買友好財團幾百倍P/E的神仙股....., 股市從來建基於信心二字!
A股股民人人看個明白, 怎會再信中央? 中央政府徹底信譽破產! 朱鎔基年老了,
還能回朝收拾這個殘局嗎?
故此, 蕭若元指, 今中國人囗紅利(demographic dividend)枯竭,
貪腐無能庸官當政, 國企進民企退更加壟斷(monopoly)把持國家資源, 國家資源更無效率地白白浪費, 經濟註定陷入長久衰退期，大陸人將全民破產！將會處處暴動頻生,
共產黨亡黨不遠矣!
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A股正讓集權意志失控
（內地財經作家 李德林）25.8.2015.
Ａ股創紀錄的跌停，令一直試圖通過國家意志扭轉頹勢的管理層灰頭土臉，集權的意志正在Ａ股中失控。
2015年的牛市就是一場為國家經濟轉型升級改革進行人造的牛市，真正的目的是削減日益高企的政府債務，尤其是地方官僚集團在過去的數年之內，為了鞏固地方政治利益，他們經常通過放大政府信用槓桿的模式進行舉債，30萬億的地方債已經成為中國金融業最大的隱患。
隨着地方官僚集團舉債的不斷增加，中央政府越來越意識到問題的嚴重性，地方債擴大的背後是中央與地方勢力的隱形博弈在加劇。地方官僚為了打通向上的升遷通路，他們會通過地方基建獲利政績跟民意，一旦債務出現問題，中央將背負庸政的惡名。中央試圖通過置換地方債的方式削弱地方官僚集團的舉債之權，進而緊縮他們通過舉債做大地方勢力的可能。
削減政府債務成為中央經濟改革的頭等大事，股市作為資源優化配置的通道，成為削減債務的先鋒，牛市最終在政府默許下升級為國家戰略。Ａ股一直就是利益集團進行利益套現的工具，所以在信息不對稱的情況下，各種違法亂紀不斷，無論是上市公司，還是莊家，從來就沒有將Ａ股當成一項事業去經營，而是當成抽血的提款機，加之60%以上的投資者為散戶，貪婪注定Ａ股的牛市是大家上演套現生死時速的致命遊戲，慢牛只是騙人的謊言。
牛市一度完美地覆蓋了地方政府的債務，政府盤算在覆蓋債務的基礎之上推動經濟轉型升級的改革。萬萬沒想到的是，股災突然來了。北京試圖通過集權意志來拯救股災。當證監會將各大投行召集起來開會時，投行們喊着「救股市就是救自己」的口號糊弄證監會，不少投行在股市雪崩的過程中袖手旁觀，氣得高級監管官員拍桌子訓斥投行無能。
地方拒絕跟隨中央
救市從一開始就發生了嚴重的內部分裂，投行的區域意識令監管官員氣急敗壞。不難發現，不少投行背後有地方官僚集團的影子，他們拒絕在關鍵時刻跟北京的拯救行動齊心協力，不斷地瓦解集權的國家意志。Ａ股救市不難發現，中央通過各種渠道加強集權，但是Ａ股中這種意識正在失控，他們期待的金融人才並沒有在他們的集團之中，導致整個拯救行動處於一種看上去有序，實則內部已經各種勢力交錯，導致他們的意志難以變成現實。
證監會宣佈證金公司不再大規模買入股票，並將大部份股票轉讓給主權投資公司匯金時，市場對國家隊的預期消失了，整個市場無法進行內生修復。儘管中央提出了要加快改革進程，甚至在70周年抗戰勝利閱兵前夕推出養老金入市政策，中央意在提振市場信心，試圖在軍事跟經濟兩個方面向世界秀肌肉，Ａ股在國家隊停止救市後再度創紀錄的暴跌，令中央相當尷尬。
問題的關鍵是，Ａ股為啥會再度創紀錄下跌呢？以國有企業改革為主導的經濟轉型升級改革實際上是一個老生常談的問題，國有企業規模越來越大，牽涉的利益越來越多，在不能解決核心的代理人問題，國有企業的改革也只能是利益集團的利益重組而已，改革的預期紅利最大的受益人只會是那些新的政治勢力。對民眾和社會整體效益起不到促進作用，加之改革的預期不是三五個月就能實現的，所以在經過一輪輪的炒作之後，勢必會打回原形。
改革預期的漫長背後，地方債再度大規模浮出水面，銀行的壞賬率急速上升，整個金融系統風險已經等不及改革的實現，養老金的萬億資金也難以破除投資者心中的猛虎。中央政府一度寄予厚望的萬眾創業隨着互聯網各種神話的破滅而開始冷卻，大量的私營部門債務和失業問題將考驗執政者的化解智慧，所以反映到股市就是對未來不確定性的恐慌。
Ａ股的牛市已經終結，國家隊的底部將是市場的頂部，偶爾的反彈只是牛市幻影的迴光返照，熊市令投資者痛苦，更令執政者如坐針氈。不斷攀升的債務，債務背後地方官僚集團同中央的政治、經濟博弈將進一步加劇。在博弈的過程中，投資者對相應概念的改革股票只可談戀愛，不能動真情。
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A股掠水天仙局: 領導先走符合國情,
阿爺，你有病嗎？
今日有單新聞係咁嘅：「彭博引述消息指，本周為止中國暫停干預股市，決策者正權衡推出空前救市措施之利弊，以及下一步舉措。消息又指，部份領導人認為股市規模相較整個經濟體太小，不足以導致危機。同時，也認為救市措施成本太高。」
領導先走符合國情
如果我將第二段翻譯做有聲post，應該係咁「冇事嘅，A股好細好細之嘛，邊有咁勁搞冧中國經濟啊，你咪生人唔生膽啦。知唔知救市最大問題係乜？貴呀！唔好嘥錢啦。」
你暴力救市咗咁耐，搞到一鑊泡，而家先話要評估自己暴力有咩影響？唔好玩啦！你強姦完人，先思考強姦無乜效果？
之前又話「改革牛」、「政策牛」，「4000點只是A股牛市的開端，一萬點才符合中國夢。」講咗一堆又一堆假大空嘅說話。而家你又同我講，A股好細嘅，唔救都唔會有事啦。阿爺，你有病嗎？今次最符合國情嘅就係「讓領導先走」。領導就走晒，緊係唔救都冇事啦，而家先嫌貴？貪完斂完揸乾完就拍拍籮柚閃，話知你班大媽水魚死，告訴我，呢個點解唔係一個天仙局？
「5000點不是夢」？一句洗腦式口號，就由「掠水五千」天仙局，令A股正式擺出一個「弱水三千」hi
hi陣。
知唔知中國槓桿有幾大？美銀美林之前估救市過，槓桿融資近4萬億人仔！蝴蝶效應聽過未？未就上網搵番《連鎖蝶變》睇返。
股市跌激起千重浪
OK，你話中國一年GDP為60萬億人仔，4萬億人仔好少箒。不過，今年上半年金融業產值，貢獻GDP為9.9%。產值同上年比增長17%，足足比中國GDP增長7%（如果呢個數係真嘅）有突。有人估算過，如果上半年金融業增速維持上年10%嘅，咁中國上半年早就「七字不保」。
股市跌，金融業都唔掂，一石激起千重浪。邊個白癡竟然會講得出，股市細就唔會危及經濟？我切咗你個屁股（正確來講，係個腦）呀，睇下你會唔會痛呀？你叫人放棄治療A股，我勸你勿放棄治療。
A股上半年急升，不少大股東均趁股價高位押股借錢，但自6月高位下瀉以來，由於股份市值大幅下降，股價逼近或已觸及押股的警戒線，隨時面臨被強制平倉！
《第一財經日報》統計顯示，今年來約有1,049家上市公司的股東，進行3,400多次押股。Wind數據指出，截至昨日（25日）收市，今年曾押股的公司中，約有798家目前股價已低於其押股時的價格，其中超過155家公司最新股價較押股時已暴瀉逾50%。
此外，近月市況動盪，不少銀行和券商一再降低押股比率，同時收緊押股的業務。
據悉，目前A股押股借錢的折扣率通常介乎三至六折之間，預警線和平倉線多為160%/140%或者150%/130%。換言之，當股價跌幅達55%、61%時，押股就可能觸及警戒線和平倉線，引發斬倉風險。
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Is This The Great Crash Of China?
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevekeen/2015/08/19/is-this-the-great-crash-of-china/3/
19.8.2015.
China has achieved a remarkable transformation in the last 30 years—something that you can only fully appreciate if, like me, you visited China before that transformation began. In 1981/82, I took a group of Australian journalists on a tour of China on behalf of the Australia-China Council. The key purpose was to take part in a seminar with Chinese journalists under the auspices of the “All-China Journalists Association”. Given the unfortunate acronym by our Chinese hosts of SAPS—for the “Sino-Australian Press Seminar”—it was the first seminar between Chinese journalists and those of any other nation.
After the seminar, we went on a tour of China, taking in Sichuan, Shanghai, and Shenzhen. Shanghai’s skyline then was dominated by Soviet-style architecture—mixed with French and Chinese touches—and on the south side of the river, paddy fields stretched as far as the eye could see. On the north side, we saw furtive black-market trading of currencies as we strolled along the banks of the Bund.
Today, some of the Soviet-style buildings still exist on the north side, while the south side is an extravaganza of skyscrapers that turn on an impressive light show every evening. So capitalism has come to China.
Almost. The one thing China hasn’t yet had is a full-blown financial crisis. But the plunging Shanghai stock market has raised fears that that quintessential capitalist experience has finally arrived in China.
In fact, this isn’t the first time that Shanghai has crashed: it did so in 2008 as well. Then the index plunged by over 2/3rds in one year (see Figure 1).
At a superficial level, the 2008 crash had it all: the index quadrupled in one year only to fall right back down over the following year. And yet it didn’t lead to a sustained economic slump, because one of the key ingredients of such a slump was absent: there had not been an explosion of private debt. While the Chinese economy had been sundering along at over 8% growth per year, private debt was effectively constant at 100% of GDP.
All that changed after the financial crisis. In just 6 years, private debt grew by over 80% of GDP—and that’s using official figures as submitted to the Bank of
InternationalSettlements (see
Figure 2) when there’s every reason to expect that this particular figure is likely to understate the actual level.
Figure 2: Private debt in China exploded as it sidestepped the Global Financial Crisis
Why does the level of private debt in China matter? If you believe
conventional economics and finance theory, it doesn’t—which is why I find myself having to repeat the (expletive deleted) obvious so often that it does.
The simple reason is that demand and income in our money-driven economies are the sum of demand and income generated by the turnover of existing money, plus that generated by the growth of the money supply, which is overwhelmingly due to new debt. When a bank lends money,
as the Bank of England patiently and sagely explains here, it creates new money. The point the Bank didn’t develop in detail, but which
I explain in this journal in a forthcoming paper, is that a huge proportion of demand (and income—pardon the repetition, but if you read the forthcoming paper, you’ll understand why) comes from the change in debt, and that this can be negative as well as positive—that is, repaying debt (or going bankrupt) destroys demand just as rising debt creates it.
China had very little debt-created demand to destroy back in 2008: then the vast majority of the collapse in demand was due to the collapse of export sales to the West as America and much of the rest of the OECD slumped into the deepest economic downturn since the Great Depression. Nominal GDP growth plunged far more than did private debt growth—see Figure 3. Nominal GDP growth dropped from over 20% per year to under 10%. The growth of private debt also slowed down in the immediate aftermath of the crisis—falling from 22% per year to 18%. But from 2009 on, growth in private credit went into hyperdrive as a deliberate government policy to boost the economy.
Figure 3: China avoided the Global Financial Crisis by boosting credit growth
Banks in the West effectively ignore what the government wants: in the West, the political class is effectively subservient to the financial class. But in China, despite its economic transformation, the political class remains dominant: any Chinese entity that ignores a government directive does so at its peril. Things are not as they were in the 1980s, when every answer to every question that I and my group of touring Australian journalists asked began with “We followed the directives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China”. But it’s still not good for your health to flout Central Committee policy.
So the Chinese banking system and its satellites lent like crazy to any company and many individuals, and one of the biggest credit bubbles in history—possibly the biggest ever—took off. In 2010, the increase in private debt in China was equivalent to 35% of GDP. That dwarfs the rate of growth of credit in both Japan and the USA prior to their crises: Japan topped out at just over 25% per year, and the USA reached a “mere” 15% of GDP per year—see Figure 4.
Figure 4: China’s credit bubble is the biggest ever
As I have argued for a decade now, crises begin when the rate of growth of credit slows down in heavily indebted countries. China was not heavily indebted in 2008, which is why it could take the credit growth path out of the Global Financial Crisis. But now it is more heavily indebted than America was when its crisis began—even relying on official statistics which undoubtedly understate the real situation—and the momentum of debt may well carry it past the peak level reached by Japan after its Bubble Economy collapsed in the early 1990s (see Figure 5).
Figure 5: China is on course to reach Japan’s Private Debt to GDP peak
So China is having its first fully-fledged capitalist crisis. To date its response to it has been to try to sustain the unsustainable: to transfer the bubble from housing to the stockmarket, and to keep the stockmarket rising like some production target for wheat from the bad old days before the fall of the
Gang of Four. It can’t be done. At some point, the Chinese government is going to have to make the transition from generating a credit bubble to trying to contain its aftermath.
How they might do that rather more intelligently than has the West will be the subject of a future post.
http://forum.memehk.com/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=164838&extra=page%3D2
轉譯 by Mark Mok of www.memehk.com
1. 在08年， 危機發生後， 中國的私人債市場， 因為金融系統配合政府的指令， 大量增加借貸，大陸全部係亞爺萬能論， 令到私人市場瘋狂借貸， 樓一百一百的買， 發展商不停借錢亂起野， 企業瘋狂擴張， 勁度樂觀
2.
甚麼是印錢？ 很簡單， 全世界一樣， 當銀行借出一D錢， 就同時創造一D錢， 這是債。
2009年開始的幾年， 中國的私人債（家庭，企業和金融債）增速破了紀錄。
對借錢或對貨幣供應的需求在這種瘋狂的環境， 很大部分係源自CHANGE OF DEBT。 例如： 按揭不停增加， 樓價不停上升， 當大家看到身邊的人擁有資產升值， 也會去增加投資， 樓市帶動經濟就業， 銀行也會樂觀， 更加進取，很大部分對借貸的需求都係在資產， 而人性越升越買， 一跌唔敢買。 股市也REPEAT了
另外係DEBT TO GDP 也會快速增加,
3.
2010, 中國私人債增長係35％的GDP， 打破了日本泡沫爆破前25％， 美國人10成樓按的金融海嘯前都只是15％。
4.
我們看到09後， 那個中國私人債增長係瘋狂過美國和日本在他們危機前的情況.
5.
甚麼時候爆破， 很不幸無人能準確預測， 目前我們知道係中國的PRIVATE DEBT對GDP， 高過美國次按風暴， 會不會超過日本才爆也有可能, 但係危機可能已經開始了也有可能， 這個我們是不知道的。
看回圖4， 一個嚴重欠債的國家， 中國比較次按前的美國嚴重， 還有中國的數字係官方.
如果私人債唔增加， 不停向下就會步入大蕭條， 而一定發生係樓和股市泡沫都會先爆破， 爆破係避免不到， 數學上不可能， 中國只可以延遲， 但係這次如果從樓泡推向股市泡沫失敗， 也有可能救不起, 你會看到日本泡沫爆破或美國金融海嘯的情況, .
China's Hard Landing? What To Watch Next In 6 Charts
http://www.forbes.com/sites/liyanchen/2015/08/25/what-to-watch-next-in-china-in-6-charts/
24.8.2015
Has the China bubble finally burst?
China’s major stock indexes extended its loss to a fourth straight day, with Shanghai Composite Index dropping nearly 7.6% on Tuesday. Despite U.S. stocks rebounded on Tuesday, the ongoing rout of China’s stock market has caused a roller coaster ride for Wall Street on Monday, with the Dow closing at 18-month low.
Much has been written about China’s growth trouble, but what are the key issues at stake that cause such turmoil in the global market? “In the short-term, investors are likely to take their cue from economic data and any policy actions or comments, particularly out of China,” wrote BlackRock’s global chief investment strategist Russ Koesterich. Thus, we compile a visual guide to understand the key concerns about China on top of the minds of Chinese and global investors.
Chart 1: Will GDP match the government’s promise?
When the government released its 7% estimate of second quarter GDP growth in July, many China watchers grew skeptical of the data’s validity. “Investors are now correct to be concerned about the future of China’s economy despite the government’s time-earned reputation of carefully managing GDP growth,” S&P Cap IQ’s Michael Thompson and Robert Keiser wrote in a note. It’s the No.1 reason why global investors are panicking – the decade-long stellar growth of the world’s second largest economy is decelerating faster than expected.
Chart 2: Will manufacturing continue to weaken?
For the past decade, China has been the world’s factory, pumping out products from electronics to clothes to auto parts. The preliminary Caixin China PMI (Purchasing Managers’ Index) shows that manufacturing activity fell to the lowest level since the financial crisis, another warning sign of slower-than-expected economic growth. “The weakness was broad-based, suggesting that the manufacturing sector continued to face the problems of overcapacity and weak demand,” J.P.Morgan’s Jahangir Aziz wrote in a note. Such bleak outlook will likely give pressure for more fiscal and monetary stimulus to stabilize growth from the Chinese government.
Chart 3: Can government intervention re-establish confidence?
After stocks tumbled on Tuesday, central bank People’s Bank of China slashed interest rates for the fifth time since November in its latest efforts to inject liquidity into the market. Since the stock market began freefalling from the record high in early June, the Chinese authorities have tightened their grip. They allowed almost half of stocks to halt trading and pumped $42 billion to purchase “blue chip” stocks, but these measures have failed to stabilize the market so far, except for injecting some short-term optimism. On Sunday, pension funds managed by local governments were granted permission to invest in public stocks for the first time – another measure to funnel capital into the equity market. Will another interest rate cut do the trick this time?
Chart 4: Will the yuan’s devaluation impact the Fed’s decision?
Allowing the yuan’s devaluation was one of the most shocking measures that the Chinese government took in recent months. The Chinese currency has been trending upward against the dollar in the past decade, so the sharp downward adjustment immediately sent Asian currencies tumbling this week. But the real question for investors is how such depreciation of the yuan, meaning a stronger dollar and more pressures from China’s exports, would impact U.S. inflation and therefore the Fed’s decision to raise interest rate.
Chart 5: Can the country’s imports and exports rebound?
One key reason for the yuan’s devaluation is the plunging exports for the world’s second largest economy. The country’s export has been the main driver of its double-digit growth for a decade and created millions of jobs that are essential to social stability. On the other hand, slower economic growth means that the country is importing fewer raw materials such as iron ore and oil, hurting commodities export-driven markets like Brazil, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. “What has occurred is a recognition of Chinese weakness, aggravating a downward trend in commodity prices,” RBC Capital Markets’ Chief U.S. market strategist Jonathan Golub wrote in a note.
Chart 6: Will the Chinese consumption growth live up to investors’ expectation?
The spending power of Chinese consumers has been the biggest story for companies not just China but also the rest of the world. “China GDP and consumption growth trends are highly relevant to U.S. corporate profitability not only because China represents the world’s second-largest economy but also because nearly half of S&P 500 Index member revenues now originate from non-domestic sources,” wrote S&P Cap IQ’s Thompson and Keiser. The loss of confidence in Chinese consumption growth is particularly a hard blow for companies with global reach and strong China exposure, such as mobile phone manufacturers.
