Thursday, March 21, 2019

涉操控股價造市,證監會凍結鼎豐(612)於富途/廣發/國泰君安/海通國際/東方/軟庫/申萬/雲鋒/新鴻基證券資產

涉操控股價造市,證監會凍結鼎豐(612)於富途/廣發/國泰君安/海通國際/東方/軟庫/申萬/雲鋒/新鴻基證券資產



https://hk.finance.appledaily.com/finance/daily/article/20190321/20638114   

記者:余慕恩

「道士股」升級 向9券商發限制令
證監凍結鼎益豐股份

打證監會今年以來行動不斷,昨向9間證券行發出限制通知書,凍結客戶賬戶內資產,懷疑戶口與中國鼎益豐(612)操控股價有關。證監未有公佈被凍結資產規模,單計9間證券行的鼎益豐持倉,估值為108億元。分析指若證實公司管理層涉及欺詐、市場失當等行為,投資者日後可索償,視乎被凍結賬戶內有否其他資產或現金。

據中央結算系統(CCASS)紀錄,9間券商持倉股份數目達4.68億股,以鼎益豐停牌前每股23.1元計算,即凍結資產規模達108億元。被勒令凍結客戶資產的9間券商分別為富途、廣發、國泰君安、海通國際、東方證券、軟庫中華金融、申萬宏源、新鴻基投資及雲鋒證券

涉操控股價

證監會強調證券行並非調查對象,它們有配合調查,凍結某些客戶資產不影響其運作或其他客戶。

證監會關注鼎益豐股價離奇飆高,並指於2018年中已經對鼎益豐股份的可疑交易展開調查,有關交易看來為該公司股份營造虛假市場,以致股價不尋常地上升。

證監會早前以《證券及期貨條例》第8.1條勒令鼎益豐停牌,隨後股份被恒指公司剔出恒指系列,鼎益豐日前發通告指證監會人員曾經造訪其辦事處,但並未有作出任何拘捕。

鼎益豐屬於「21章公司」,即主營業務為投資炒賣,無其他實業,亦獲豁免遵守最低公眾持股要求。鼎益豐停牌前收報23.1元,較其每股資產淨值0.27元高出85倍,市賬率(PB)近百倍,市值達286億元。

鼎益豐前身是中國投資基金,「道士股」主席隋廣義以「禪易投資法」作招徠,2015年看中「中投基金」(612),當時被指於內地非法吸金,但股價越升越高,去年11月更納入MSCI中國指數,兩大ETF發行商貝萊德及領航最新分別持股2.19%及0.14%,所持股份市值共7億元。年初至停牌前,平均每日成交額由數千萬元至3億元不等。

香港投資者學會會長譚紹興表示,假設鼎益豐管理層涉及欺詐,以不法手段舞弄股價,投資者可嘗試索償,不過這類二手市場交易,難證明「錢係咪落公司袋」,要還原至交易前的狀況則幾乎沒有可能。獨立股評人David Webb稱被凍結賬戶內或有其他現金或資產,現階段難言索償的成功機會。





莊家操弄毐股:    生人勿近  散戶勿沾手

ASM 太平洋 (522)

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Monday, March 18, 2019

金蝶國際(268)泡沫股 核心盈利其實好少! Inside the Kingdee bubble

獨立股評人David Webb再化身「神之手」,戳穿股壇泡沫。Webb昨發表文章斥金蝶(268)犯「三宗罪」,指其盈利能力虛有其表、併購眼光失準兼以表外形式隱藏虧損。Webb回覆本報指,金蝶財務問題不難拆解,「我只係用周末嘅兩日時間,就睇了相關通告同年報。」

指中央補貼造成不公平

金蝶昨日挫14.2%至9.11元,市值蒸發近50億元,成交額升至13.76億元。Webb批評,金蝶不僅在股價上存在泡沫,還在業務上存在中央政府的手影。

他分析了金蝶自2008年至今的11年財務報表,總計有27.64億元(人民幣.下同)核心經營盈利,但扣除當中的投資物業公平值增加、淨租金收入、一次性項目和政府資助後,盈利即減65.2%至9.61億元,若再撇除增值稅退稅,便倒蝕6.4億元。單看2018年數據,報告顯示期內錄4.53億元核心經營溢利,但據上述項目撇除「水份」,實質只得5,794萬元。

而且,金蝶在併購業務方面時有失手。Webb指,金蝶在2011年斥資1.2億元,收購互聯網醫療業務,後來易名而成「金蝶醫療」,惟盈利能力不佳,於2014年及2015年分別虧損757萬及1,818萬元,金蝶不作商譽撥備,卻在其後賣給大股東徐少春。

Webb又指出,金蝶在2016年向徐少春售「雲之家」85%股權,金蝶和雲之家之後持續有關連交易,例如雲之家向金蝶付3,730萬元作推廣產品,金蝶又因分銷雲之家產品及推廣金蝶產品,向其付6,100萬元,金蝶有通過表外形式吸納公司虧損之嫌。

Webb對本報稱,中央對不同公司徵收不同稅率,結果金蝶相當部份的盈利來自國策補貼,中央猶如利用公共財產在不同行業「養」龍頭,除了對沒補貼或補貼力度極低的國家,造成不公平競爭,成為貿易戰的一個觸發點,亦最終會令中國競爭力弱化,認為中央應撤回補貼,令市場經濟運作重返軌道。
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https://hk.finance.appledaily.com/finance/realtime/article/20190318/59382012



David Webb狙擊金蝶曾插逾一成 

「是泡沫股 核心盈利其實好少」

股壇長毛David Webb於其網誌發表最新文章,指金蝶國際(268)表面上似一家「深圳製造」的成功故事,展示出其主席兼大股東徐少春是中國管理層的模範,但深入探討後,會發現金蝶是一隻泡沫股票,是一家倚賴行業減稅、政府資助、物業投資獲利及關連公司問題交易來谷高入賬盈利的公司。

受消息拖累,金蝶股價午後一度下跌13.37%,低見9.2元;現跌9.22%,報9.65元,成交8.9億元。該股年初至上周五累積升幅超過六成。

David Webb計算了金蝶2008年迄今11年於報表上的核心經營盈利,總共達到27.64億人民幣,但當扣除投資物業公平值增加、淨租金收入、一次性項目、政府資助後,11年總共盈利降至9.61億人民幣,再不計及增值稅退稅,11年來總共錄得6.4億人民幣虧損。其中,2018年不計及上述項目後的核心盈利更只有5,794萬人民幣,大幅低於報表上披露的4.53億人幣核心經營溢利。

以上周五收市價10.62元計,金蝶的市值為350.8億元,2018年業績顯示收入28.1億人民幣,市值相當於收入的11倍。

David Webb指出,金蝶2018年業績顯示,其關連方貸款由1.64億升至7.22億人民幣,數字增加全來自下半年度,業績並未作任何解釋。關於這筆關連貸款,David Webb表示要回帶至2016年7月28日的公告,當時金蝶同意出售前海百遞100%股權、雲之家85%及金蝶醫療100%業務予徐少春旗下公司,作價1.074億人民幣,金蝶因此錄得1.388億人幣的稅前出售收益,反映該等資產原本屬負資產。

不過,這並沒有降低金蝶的財務風險,因為金蝶慷慨地留低6,170萬及1.05億人民幣的貸款餘額給雲之家及金蝶醫療,貸款3年期,由2016年1月1日起始,至2018年12月14日金蝶公佈續期3年,其中雲之家的貸款減少3,000萬人幣。

雲之家2014年及2015年分別虧損2,410萬及8,130萬人民幣,2016年出售後,2019年3月6日宣佈再收購雲之家,作價5,050萬人民幣買入51.73%權益,2017年及2018年雲之家虧損1.406億及1.225億人民幣。雖然不知道金蝶的關連方貸款借給那家公司,但收購雲之家股權後,之後關於雲之家的貸款不會當作關連方貸款。金蝶與雲之家之間存在持續關連交易,以金蝶分銷雲之家產品及交叉推廣金蝶產品的形式進行。自2016年7月28日至2018年11月30日,雲之家支付金蝶3,730萬人民幣費用,作為推廣產品;金蝶支付6,100萬人民幣,作為分銷雲之家的產品及推廣金蝶產品。透過一連串動作,David Webb認為能以表外方式吸收金蝶的虧損,同時向雲之家提供財務支持。

至於金蝶於2011年以最高1.2億人民幣作價收購後來易名的金蝶醫療,後者業績表現差勁,2014年及2015年分別錄虧損757萬及1,818萬人民幣,但金蝶當初並沒為該收購進行商譽撥備,其後賣給徐少春。

物業投資方面,當投資物業不超過總資產5%,便毋須披露物業地址,金蝶沒披露相關資訊,仍符合規定。於2018年底,投資物業價值18.2億人民幣,相當於淨有形資產四成水平,自2008年至今的11年,金蝶投資物業重估收益達5.9億人民幣及淨租金收入4.53億人幣。David Webb指,除此之外,金蝶亦靠減稅、政府資助、一次性項目催谷盈利。

David Webb最後提到,企業軟件屬於競爭大的市場,金蝶明顯有真正的業務,但只能僅僅錄得核心經營溢利。其淨有形資產僅1.58元人民幣,包括0.74元淨現金及0.63元的投資物業,種種因素令他覺得金蝶是一隻泡沫股。

對於David Webb的觀點,金蝶管理層認為,金蝶雲轉型戰略非常正確,這幾年業績有目共睹,對未來充滿信心。對於回購雲之家以及依靠政府補貼、稅務減免及物業投資估值收益等指控,公司稍後會進一步回應。

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https://webb-site.com/articles/kingbubble.asp

Inside the Kingdee bubble
18 March 2019

On the face of it, Kingdee International Software Group Co Ltd (Kingdee, 0268) might seem like a made-in-Shenzhen success story, a demonstration of what its Chairman, CEO and largest shareholder Robert Xu Shao Chun (Mr Xu) calls "the Chinese management model". Who knew that there is a better way of doing things, unique to China? The stock has more than tripled in the last 2 years.
Dig deeper, and you will find that it's a bubble stock, in a company which has relied on sector-specific tax breaks, government grants, property investment gains and questionable transactions with related parties to book any profit at all. Pour yourself a coffee and we'll explain.
At the closing price of $10.62 on Friday (15-Mar-2019), Kingdee has a market value of HK$35.08bn. The 2018 results published last week show revenues of CNY2.81bn (HK$3.20bn at the year-end rate), so it is trading on 11.0x revenues. You read that right: revenues, not earnings. We'll get to whether there is any E in the P/E later.
Note 4 of the results shows an alarming increase in the "loans to related parties", up from CNY164m to CNY722m. All of this increase happened in the second half of the year, and without any announcement of new connected transactions, if these are. The 30-Jun-2018 interim report showed a balance of  CNY134m, because CNY30m had been repaid in the first half. At that point, these loans were to 2 companies controlled by Mr Xu but formerly controlled by Kingdee. The results do not include any explanation for the increase, or any discussion of the balance sheet at all.

2016 disposal: off balance-sheet, but not off-risk

To understand the origin of these loans, we need to review a transaction announced on 28-Jul-2016, in which Kingdee sold interests in 3 companies to Mr Xu:
  • Shenzhen Qianhai Baidi Network Co Ltd, "principally engaged in the provision of courier and logistics information services such as courier enquiry and tracking services". Kingdee sold 100% for CNY55.7m.
  • Shenzhen CloudHub Network Co Ltd (Cloudhub), "principally engaged in the provision of mobile Internet enterprise services through a mobile office platform". Kingdee sold 85% for CNY43.3m and retained 15%, subsequently diluted.
  • Shanghai Kingdee Medical Software Co., Ltd. (SKM), "principally engaged in the development and operation of medical information systems and software and medical records database, as well as the provision of mobile Internet hospital services through mobile service platforms which connect patients and hospitals." Kingdee sold 100% for CNY8.4m.
All 3 were loss-making. No figures for their respective net assets/liabilities were disclosed, but for the total price of CNY107.4m, Kingdee booked a disposal gain of CNY138.8m before tax (CNY133.6m after tax), implying that the 3 had combined negative net assets of CNY31.4m.
The stated reasons for the disposals included "to alleviate further operating margin and financial pressures on the Group". It surely did, and we'll get to that below. However, it didn't eliminate financial risk, because Kingdee generously left outstanding loans to CloudHub and SKM in the amounts of CNY61.7m and CNY105.0m respectively. No reason was given for that. The 3-year loan agreements purportedly pre-dated the sale, being dated 1-Jan-2016, which was a public holiday even in mainland China. On 14-Dec-2018, Kingdee announced that the loans would be extended for another 3 years, but with the Cloudhub loan reduced by CNY30m. Giving reasons for the extension, Kingdee described the two borrowers as "important business partners of the Group" to which it should "continue to provide financial support".
There was no discussion in the announcement of how Mr Xu would divide his time and efforts between his private and public entities. In each case in this article, under the Listing Rules thresholds which were relaxed some years ago, none of the connected transactions was large enough to require independent shareholders' approval, so it was left to the board of directors (excluding Mr Xu) to approve them on each occasion.

Kingdee Medical

Going back further, we see that SKM was set up by Kingdee in 2011 to buy 75% of Guangzhou Wisetop Computer Co Ltd, which it renamed "Kingdee Medical Software Technology Co Ltd" (KMS). The price on that deal, announced on 1-Aug-2011, was CNY120m, of which about CNY46m was subject to adjustment based on 2011 and 2012 profits. Kingdee, via SKM, then injected CNY30m of cash and CNY26m of existing business into KMS to raise its stake to 81.48%. So the outstanding loan of Kingdee to SKM basically represents the high price it paid out to the unnamed vendor of KMS.
The 2011 Kingdee accounts (Note 35(a)) show that KMS made full-year turnover of CNY38.98m and net profit of CNY4.13m, so the P/E on the purchase was about 29. The 2012 accounts (Note 34) show that as a result of the (poor) performance of KMS in 2012, the contingent consideration was reduced by CNY13.01m, recognised as a 1-off gain in Kingdee's income statement. The2013 accounts (Note 21(c)) show a further reduction of the contingent consideration by CNY23.16m, generating another gain.  Despite this, in both years there was no impairment of the goodwill previously paid on the acquisition of KMS. Isn't it great how poor performance  of a subsidiary can increase your profits? In the following years there never was any impairment of the goodwill on KMS, but the 2016 disposal announcement reveals that in 2014 and 2015, SKM (including KMS) made losses of CNY7.57m and CNY18.18m respectively.

Cloudhub

Now we turn to Cloudhub. The 2016 disposal announcement stated that in 2014 and 2015, Cloudhub lost CNY24.1m and CNY81.3m respectively.
Reading the Kingdee reports for 2016 and 2017, you might forget that Kingdee had sold 85% of the Cloudhub business. The word "cloud" appears 123 and 151 times in the 2016 and 2017 annual reports. In the 2016 annual report, the Chairman writes "the business volume of CloudHub experienced robust growth." Well he should know - he owned it.
Meanwhile in an unannounced transaction on 29-Feb-2016, Kingdee bought 58% of Shanghai Guanyi Cloudcomputing Software Co Ltd (Guanyi) for CNY247.4m including CNY191.9m in cash and CNY55.4m contingent payout, although Kingdee reckoned on reclaiming CNY16.7m under a profit guarantee. The 2016 accounts detail the transaction in Note 37 but fail to disclose what the turnover or profit contribution of Guanyi was post-acquisition or what it would have been for the whole year. Such disclosure is required by IFRS3 (or its HK equivalent, HKFRS3, para B64(q)). In 2017, the related profit guarantee was cancelled, and Kingdee booked a gain of CNY25.1m, implying that the final earn-out was only CNY13.6m. Kingdee still holds CNY181.3m of goodwill for this acquisition, unimpaired.

The return of Cloudhub

On 6-Mar-2019, a week before the results announcement, Kingdee announced that it would buy back control of Cloudhub from Mr Xu, paying CNY50.5m for his 51.73% stake. The stakes of both Kingdee and Mr Xu had been diluted since the 2016 transaction, reducing Kingdee to 9.13%. The other 39.14% is said to be owned by unnamed independent third parties.
The announcement revealed that in 2017 and 2018, Cloudhub lost CNY140.6m and CNY122.5m respectively, and had negative net assets at 31-Dec-2018 of CNY326.4m. We don't know what it lost in 2016, but if we average between 2015 and 2017, then that would be a 2016 loss of CNY111m, of which (pro rata) about CNY46m was in the 5 months after the disposal. Hence we estimate Cloudhub has lost about CNY309m from its disposal in 2016 until 31-Dec-2018, plus whatever it has lost since then.
Now, we don't (yet) know which related parties increased their borrowings from Kingdee in the second half of 2018 and whether that includes Cloudhub, but whatever outstanding loans there are to Cloudhub will disappear in the Kingdee group accounts when Cloudhub becomes a subsidiary again. Magic!
While Cloudhub was controlled by Mr Xu, there were ongoing connected transactions between Kingdee and Cloudhub in the form of distribution by Kingdee of Cloudhub's products and cross-promotion of Kingdee's products. These transactions were renewed as announced on 2-Jan-2019, and it seems fairly clear that Cloudhub is and always has been an integral part of the Kingdee product offering and strategy - see for example this page on the Kingdee web site. In the 2017 annual report, the Chairman wrote: "the newly-launched CloudHub was further integrated with the Group's Cloud products, including Kingdee Cloud, Jingdou Cloud and Guanyi Cloud...".
In the period from disposal on 28-Jul-2016 to 30-Nov-2018, Cloudhub paid Kingdee fees of CNY37.3m for promoting its "PublicCloud Products", and in the other direction, Kingdee paid Cloudhub CNY61.0m as a distributor of Cloudhub's products and for promoting Kingdee products.
All of this invites the inference that Cloudhub was used as an off-balance-sheet part of the Kingdee group, helping absorb losses on an integral part of the Kingdee product offering while receiving financial support from Kingdee, and is now brought back without those losses ever hitting the Kingdee income statement; instead there will be another large goodwill item representing the difference between the purchase price and the negative net assets of Cloudhub. We hope that their software engineering is as good as their financial engineering.

Property investment

Since 2008, Kingdee has had a growing property investment segment which appears to be surplus floors or buildings in its Shanghai and Shenzhen "Research Centers". We say "appears", because the last time there was even the vaguest description of these properties was in Note 9 of the 2012 annual accounts, but even then, there was no disclosure of the exact addresses as required by paragraph 23 of Appendix 16 of the Listing Rules when your investment properties exceed 5% of total assets. At 31-Dec-2018, the investment properties were valued at CNY1.82bn (HK$2.07bn), or about 40% of the net tangible assets attributable to owners of CNY4.57bn (HK$5.21bn).
In the 11 years since 2008 inclusive, Kingdee has booked gains on revaluation of its investment properties of CNY590m and net rental income before tax of CNY453m. There's nothing wrong with the accounting on that, but it does help mask the poor profitability of its software business.
We combed through the management discussion and analyses since 2008 and could not find any mention of the strategy or plan for this business, presumably because there isn't one. No discussion of tenancies, rental yields or occupancy rates, for example. The Kingdee segment analyses simply record it as "Others", even though it contributed CNY150.7m, or 36.6%, of the 2018 profit attributable to shareholders.

Corporate income tax break

Kingdee's main subsidiary, Kingdee Software (China) Co Ltd, is what China calls a "National Important Software Enterprise" (NISE), so it gets a preferential tax rate of 10%. NISE if you can get it. We can't blame Kingdee for eating a free lunch, but it does underline the central planning and sector-favouritism that goes into the PRC economy, and we've seen the same policies encroaching on Hong Kong. The question is whether sector-specific tax rates are sustainable if China decides, as part of its trade negotiations, to stop favouring specific sectors.
Even in the property investment ("Other") segment, Kingdee applies this 10% rate to its revaluation gains and net rental income, although it is difficult to see why it should be treated differently to other landlords. It probably holds these assets through its NISE-qualified subsidiaries because Kingdee staff are in other floors or buildings of the same sites.

VAT tax break

Under PRC Value-Added Tax (VAT) regulations, companies involved in developing software and integrated circuits in the PRC collect VAT at 16% (before 1-May-2018: 17%) on their sales but then get a refund which reduces their VAT (net of VAT they have paid on input costs) to 3% of their sales. This has been a huge contributor to Kingdee's profitability. In 2018, Kingdee booked a VAT refund of CNY178.5m, or 39.8% of its pre-tax profit. In the 11 years since 2008 inclusive, it has booked CNY1.60bn of VAT refunds. This again may be an unsustainable state subsidy. If the refund went away without any rate adjustment, then customers would still be paying the 16% VAT and if they are VAT-registered enterprises themselves, they would still get the input credit for it. So it is hard to see how Kingdee could raise its prices to compensate for the lost refunds.

Government grants

As if the 10% income tax rate and the VAT refunds weren't enough, the state also pours government grants into software developers. Kingdee booked CNY43.3m in 2018 and CNY491m in the 11 years since 2008 inclusive. Again, we can't blame Kingdee for eating a free lunch, but that stream of Chinese take-aways is probably not something to depend on, particularly if China is trying to demonstrate to its trade partners that it doesn't micro-manage the economy or subsidise its corporates.

One-off gains
We've mentioned several of the one-off gains which have supplemented Kingdee's "operating profit" over the years, including the 2016 gain on disposal of Cloudhub and 2 other entities, and the gains on reducing deferred acquisition pay-outs without impairing goodwill. Here's a summary of all of them since 2008:

So now you see that even with VAT refunds, the software business struggles to make much profit. After deducting VAT refunds, it made operating losses in 6 of the last 8 years. If you also factor Cloudhub back in, as if they had never shifted it out, then you are looking at a combined operating loss of CNY65m in the last financial year and CNY950m over 11 years. In that time, they've made more investing in property than they've lost on selling software and services.
Yes, revenue has grown, by about 38.9% between 2011 and 2018, or a compound average of 4.8% per year - but that's only a bit more than consumer price inflation, even if the growth rate has been higher in the last 2 years. Investors should not extrapolate that erratic record too far.

Funding and shareholders

Mr Xu currently holds about 24.1% of Kingdee.
Kingdee has conducted 2 substantial fund-raisings, in 2014 and 2015. In 2014, Kingdee issued a US$175m (HK$1357m) bond convertible at HK$3.90 per share, resulting in 348.075m new shares when it had fully converted on 24-Apr-2018. On 16-May-2015, Nasdaq-listed Chinese online retailer JD.com Inc subscribed for 288.526m shares at $4.60, raising HK$1327m gross. That was 10% of Kingdee at the time, although subsequent dilution would make it 8.74% unless it has bought more shares. There has been no subsequent filing. Amongst institutions, Capital Groupholds 10.08%.
Kingdee has been quite popular on the Shenzhen Southbound Connect, where the depository currently holds 8.61% of the stock, down from a peak of 15.03% on 28-May-2018. The outstanding aggregate short position disclosed to the SFC was 7.77% at 8-Mar-2019, making it the 5th most shorted stock as a percentage of outstanding shares, excluding H-shares and ETFs. That also means there are 107.77% long positions.

Other corporate governance issues

Apart from the unexplained increase in "loans to related parties", the balance sheet holds some other horrors. Given that the bonds fully converted and with all that money from JD.com, Kingdee has far more capital than it needs. It hasn't invested in data centers or other capital-intensive infrastructure - is outsources that, including to Amazon's cloud. It has fixed assets (excluding the investment properties) of just CNY558m. It has net cash of CNY1511m, and it has financial assets of CNY639m which are probably all "wealth management products" based on the interim report, although we'll have to wait for the 2018 annual report to be sure. The cash flow statement shows a heavy turnover of these - they bought and sold or redeemed over CNY3.7bn of financial assets during the year.
In 2017, Kingdee also seems to have started a money-lending business, with year-end loans to third parties of CNY65m, growing to CNY108m in 2018. The 2018 cash flow statement refers to this as "the micro-credit business".
Despite being listed in HK and having no listing anywhere else, Kingdee holds all its AGMs in Shenzhen, making attendance challenging, particularly if you don't have a Mainland Travel Permit or a visa. We suspect non-employee attendance is minimal. AGM locations should not be chosen for employees who can see their bosses any day that they are available - they are an annual opportunity for outside shareholders to meet with all the directors. A review of the Corporate Governance reports shows that none of the NEDs or INEDs attended the AGM since reports of attendance began in 2013, in breach of then Corporate Governance code provision A.6.7, even though Kingdee claims to have conformed with the Code.
Despite the huge CNY2.15bn (HK$2.45bn) pile of net cash and wealth management products, Kingdee has proposed a dividend of just CNY0.01 for the 2018 year, or about CNY33m in total. How they reach that number, or why they even bother to pay such a token amount, is a mystery. There is no mention of the obese balance sheet in the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) in the results announcement, nor has it featured in MD&As in previous annual reports, in breach of 32(1) and (2) of Appendix 16 of the Listing Rules. Readers would be forgiven for thinking that none of the directors had actually read the balance sheet, and also that the for-profit Stock Exchange of Hong Kong has been failing to enforce its own Listing Rules on disclosure, because they don't want to put more resources into actually reviewing the disclosures.

So what's it worth then?

Enterprise software is a competitive market, but there's clearly a real business in Kingdee - it just rarely or barely makes a core operating profit, is heavily dependent on state favours to its sector, and is run by people who appear to be comfortable with out-and-back transactions over Cloudhub, lending to businesses controlled by the Chairman, investing shareholders' money in wealth management products and starting up a microfinance business; and uncomfortable with the idea of independent shareholders talking to independent directors at AGMs and perhaps asking awkward questions like "where's the return on my equity?" It's difficult to attach much value to such a business and if this is "the Chinese management model" then we'll manage without it, thank you.
Kingdee has a net tangible asset value of HK$1.58 per share including $0.74 of net cash and investments and $0.63 of investment properties, so that provides some modest underpinning. Although Mr Xu calls himself the "controlling shareholder", his 24% stake is not enough to prevent activists pushing for change after the bubble bursts (as all bubbles do), so some of that value could be extracted, but as the stock is trading at 6.7x book value, at this point it doesn't matter.
We'll leave you with this quote from the 2018 results - they may be short on disclosure, but they're very long on technobabble:
"Kingdee created the unique KDDM Cloud dynamic domain model to support personalized Cloud service, and integrated social networking, artificial intelligence, Big Data and Blockchain technologies to provide scenario-based platform services for enterprise applications."

Thursday, March 14, 2019

證監會罰缺失盡職審查IPO保薦人:瑞銀, 摩根士丹利, 美林, 渣打.涉中國森林 (930), 天合化工(1619), 中金再生(773); Webb倡勒令問題股清盤 向股東回水

證監會罰缺失盡職審查(due diligence)IPO保薦人: 瑞銀, 摩根士丹利, 美林, 渣打銀行. 涉中國森林 (930), 天合化工 (1619), 中金再生 (773) ...;   David Webb 倡SFC 勒令問題股清盤  向股東回水

香港無法無天, 只有罰短期釘牌, 無人受刑責, 而所涉公司的高管, CEO, Accountant, 專業會計師, 核數師, 律師竟亦無人受罰! 主兇, 幫兇, 賣奸計的專業人士皆無人受罰, 豉勵賣奸計的專業人士無所顧忌地推廣其作弊犯科呃股民血汗錢的財路!

保薦負責員工巨額花紅已落袋保薦費, 承銷佣金, 綠鞋 Green shoes割草, 窩輪, 牛熊沽空, 吹魔笛大行報告放瘋的莊家回禮 ......  利益樣樣幾百億元, 這次被罪幾億算係抽利得稅囉, 或是打賞奴才的小小紅封包, 濕濕碎啦!  小良子收了紅封包, 就快跪啦!




https://hk.finance.appledaily.com/finance/daily/article/20190318/20635683  記者:余秉峰

Webb促證監 倡行動升級 

勒令問題股清盤  向股東回水


David Webb是最近股壇當紅人物,上月尾他去信證監會,投訴鼎益豐(612)市值存在泡沫,證監會本月初隨即勒令此股停牌。過往Webb揀股點石成金,近年評股尤其「謎網股」則一點即爆,其舉動成為市場焦點。他回覆本報指,對如何整頓鼎益豐這類「21章公司」有新睇法;而對於證監會的執法行動,他認為「有空間更進一步」,當中包括要求有問題的上市公司清盤,再向小股東發還現金資產。

股壇長毛Webb近年的行動,一石擊起千層浪,被市場中人戲言是股壇神之手。據了解,有細價股人士曾私下撿走Webb寫字樓的垃圾,試圖找出其調查股份方向,但發現Webb每次都將文件以碎紙機銷毀至粉碎,最後無功而還。

21章公司宜加識別標誌

Webb接受本報查詢時表示,他並不知道證監會對鼎益豐的行動,是否出於跟進其投訴。除了鼎益豐,證監會亦對另一家「21章公司」大唐投資(1160),發出股權高度集中警告,詳列大唐投資3大主要股東持74.65%股權,連同另外17名股東更佔大唐投資逾97%股權,又指大唐截至今年1月底的未經審核資產淨值為每股0.09元,但在3月7日的收市價高達2.03元,市值足足高出了21.6倍,正好與Webb的警示相呼應。

過去Webb已多次發表文章,指出多間「21章公司」存在漏弊,但他認為毋須抹殺所有「21章公司」的存在,因為港股理應有基金管理公司存在,「我們需要通過完善監管制度滿足需求」。面對公眾的層面,Webb建議要如「同股不同權」股票般,為投資公司上市號碼加上識別標誌,令公眾容易意識到並非正常的上市公司。Webb又指當局應對「21章公司」設下更高的企業管治標準,包括公司要每月公佈十大投資項目,及投資管理人員不應進入董事局等。

自2017年先後爆出「謎網事件」和「康宏風暴」,證監會密密勒令疑似有問題的上市公司停牌,但之後鮮有其他行動配合。Webb批評證監會決定檢控有問題的人士或機構前,往往要經相當長的時間,「正如我在2017年公佈謎網集團後,雖然許多公司牽涉其中,但證監會至今仍未控告任何人。」他指證監會:「行動並不足夠,亦未有善用手上所有工具。」

單是勒令上市公司停牌,根本無助相關小股東維護權益,Webb以「謎網股」成員隆成(1225)為例,公司遭勒令停牌後仍在經營業務,其財務報表顯示每股資產淨值高於停牌前的0.127元,故證監會有空間進一步執法,「指令隆成先進行清盤,然後向股東返還對應的現金資產。」

勸證監不能走回頭路

上周證監會開出最重罰單,四間外資行因涉及三間民企的保薦缺失,被罰款共8億元。但買入這些民企股份的散戶已無仇報,難以追回損失。Webb引用洪良國際(946,已除牌)案例,指當年洪良在招股書中誇大財務數據,證監會運用權力勒令洪良向公眾股東回購股票,令認購洪良的小股東成功取回絕大部份資金,但近年卻沒有善用這權力到類似的案件上。他認為當局不能走回頭路,「所以你問我他們是否有很大的進步,我會答還沒有。」
*
https://hk.news.appledaily.com/local/daily/article/20190315/20633839    記者:余慕恩 陳雪蕾, 李芷珊, 李海澄,

歷來最重 亂保薦民企上市
四大外資行罰8億


證監會重鎚出擊重罰投行新股保薦人。四間大型外資投行被證監會指摘保薦新股上市時有缺失,被罰近8億,當中又以瑞銀被罰3.75億元、釘牌一年最重。其餘三家為渣打美林摩根士丹利。業內人士普遍認為巨額罰款將令投行「揀客」更謹慎,並預料這一波保薦人處分行動陸續有來。
今次四間投行被罰,主要涉及兩宗曾轟動市場的造假案件,分別是2009年上市、早已被證監會勒令除牌的中國森林,以及2014年上市、現已停牌的天合化工(1619),而四間投行均因其盡職審查(due diligence)工作有錯漏而被罰。中森一案中,渣打及瑞銀擔任保薦人,意味為中森安排上市前,有責任完成到公司營業地點視察、與公司客戶及供應商等會面索取財務資料、辨識不尋常造假迹象等前期功夫。


負責員工巨額花紅已落袋

證監會在處分聲明中詳列瑞銀如何失職,指瑞銀並沒有到中森旗下位處四川及雲南的森林視察,核實所謂的森林資產是否真實存在,其次是瑞銀沒有核實該片森林林權、受保範圍,又沒有對聲稱為中森客戶人士「起底」調查。

中森上市一年後,核數師畢馬威首先發現賬目有問題,證監會後介入調查,最終揭發中森財報中,營業額及資產值等廣泛造假。

在本港保薦人制度下,新股上市需要委任持有證監會所發牌照的投行作盡職審查。要取得保薦人資格,投行需要先領6號「就機構融資提供意見」牌照,符合最少1,000萬股本要求;另外有兩名合資格「主要人員」負責監督工作。今次中森案瑞銀時任主要人員岑天被罰「釘牌」兩年,證監會指瑞銀的缺失歸咎於他疏忽職守、監督不力所致。 

天合化工一案,瑞銀、美林及大摩擔任其上市保薦人,證監會指摘他們就天合的客戶做盡職調查時,沒有採取主動決定會面形式及地點,反而由天合決定會面對象,部份會面更是在客戶家中進行;又指保薦人對於明顯預警迹象絲毫不覺,例如其中一名受訪客戶拒絕出示名片,衝出會議室,坦言出席會面是為幫助天合行政總裁家族,但三保薦人均未有作出任何跟進行動。證監會早年曾就保薦人刑事責任諮詢市場,惟最後未有落實。今次事件中負責保薦的員工,巨額花紅已落袋,並四散到不同投行工作。

證監會指出,若保薦人進行的盡職審查工作未能符合標準,而導致不適合上市的公司仍獲得上市地位及最終倒閉,或會令公眾投資者蒙受巨大損失,並打擊他們對香港金融市場的信心。因此必須就保薦人的缺失處以具阻嚇作用罰則。

證監會這次對保薦人罰款規模之巨,屬前所未見,對上一宗保薦瑞金246)上市的花旗,去年5月被罰5,700萬元,證監今首次開出逾億罰單,惟料這一波行動並未結束,該會法規執行部執行董事魏建新Thomas Atkinson去年10月曾表示,年內針對29間保薦人及39宗上市申請調查,並已向9間保薦人企業及四個負責人發出初步處分通知。

涉案中森清盤 天合停牌



令四家投行被罰巨款的三家公司,其中兩家中國森林及天合化工均為民企,上市後因財務違規行為而遭停牌或除牌。

中國森林2009年11月掛牌(除牌前編號930),主席為李國昌,當時集資約17億,業務為採伐與再生等森林管理工作。惟上市不足一年,該公司被核數師畢馬威發現賬目有問題,不久便遭停牌,當時其股價停留在2.925元,市值約89.52億,若以其4.34元高位計算,停牌後投資者每手損失約2,830元。至2015年6月,集團因拖欠及無法償還債務而申請清盤,2017年2月被港交所取消上市地位。



天合化工1619)2014年6月上市,主席為魏奇,當時集資約58億,集團主要從事化工產品生產。惟掛牌不足三個月,天合便遭沽空機構匿名分析狙擊,指其誇大收入及盈利,給予「強烈建議出售」評級,目標價更直接降至零。2015年3月,天合因未能如期公佈2014年業績而自行停牌。兩個月後,天合便遭證監以證券及期貨(在證券市場上市)規則條例第8(1)條勒令停牌至今。股價停牌前報1.17元,市值高達290.19億。天合曾高見2.5元,若投資者由高位持貨至停牌,每手損失約2,660元。


傳中金再生同捲風波

市傳第三家公司為中金再生(除牌前編號773),從事廢金屬回收再加工業務。主席為秦志。集團2009年上市,至2013年便因涉嫌欺詐而被停牌,兩年後遭證監會勒令清盤。
今次被罰最「甘」的瑞銀,10年前IPO市場佔有率排名第一,緊隨其後的是摩根士丹利,不過時至今日,IPO生意已被中資追上,去年排名第一的是招商銀行,市場佔比份額亦較以往更分散。有業內人士指,現時投資銀行不分中外資,聘請的多數是「海歸派」內地留學生或高幹子弟

請人以海歸派為主

翻查彭博數據資料庫,2018年新股投行排名中,以經手的集資額計算,以招商銀行為首,其次招證,農行排名第三,摩根士丹利三甲不入,四行市佔各為約5%,與2009年中森上市的年頭相比,當時市佔最高的是瑞銀,經手集資額市場佔比19%,大摩亦佔近13%。 

瑞銀去年3月在年報首披露正被證監會調查,雖未被正式「釘牌」,但亦再無從事保薦香港新股上市,時任瑞銀的投行高層亦相繼離開,當中最出名為瑞銀全球資本市場亞洲區前總裁朱俊偉Joseph Chee,朱俊偉2017年離開瑞銀,當時傳自組私募基金,據證監會資料顯示,他目前並無有效牌照,其他高層亦已經各散東西。

證監會紀錄顯示,瑞銀現有六名主要人員,渣打兩年前已撤出香港市場的保薦人業務。

有投行經驗的公專發言人甄文星指,證監巨額罰款對投行而言打擊大,難以要求保薦人工作達到法證會計師水平,近年來港上市公司大多為中資背景,對中資投行接生意較有利,但較大型新股如小米(1810)、美團(3690)等,亦需要外資行參與承銷。不過近年不論中外資,投行請人亦以「海歸派」、高幹子弟為主,方便拉生意。

保薦人「懶懶閒」變相配合內企造假

過往證監會不時就上市申請保薦人缺失予以懲罰,但往往發現時公司已上市,投資者已有損失,只能事後追究;上市時散戶亦只能相信招股書等資料,無從防備。

宏高證券投資經理梁杰文指出,以往有保薦人沒有花心思及「懶懶閒」。他認為,為內地公司作上市申請保薦人尤其有風險,「香港人好難呃香港人,相反內地人博我哋唔熟悉內地文件、法例,但香港人太仁慈,多數以為數目有水份,所以騙局容易成功」。保薦人如以懶散態度應對,即使明知電話無法核實對方身份,亦願意接受這種調查方式,「就係配合客戶造假」。2013年保薦人新例開始實施,監管要求更高,證監會可對違規者予以罰款、暫時吊銷牌照甚至永久撤銷牌照。梁杰文表示,以前保薦人多抱着「快快做完袋花紅走」的心態,因此輕視後果嚴重性。

過往保薦人的蠱惑招往往牽涉審查疏忽。2017年3月,證監會曾就交銀國際(3329)旗下的交銀亞洲,為中國惠農擔任保薦人缺失,罰款1,500萬元。當時交銀發現中國惠農CEO曾就短期貸款提供擔保,但並未確定擔保貸款總額、利益衝突等,最終港交所發回中國惠農的上市申請。

另外,去年7月證監會就建行(939)旗下建銀國際,於2013年及2014年擔任福建東亞保薦人缺失,罰款2,400萬元。當時建銀國際沒有跟相關客戶或第三方付款方會面,及未有就預警迹象盡職審查。花旗亦於去年5月被證監會譴責作為瑞金礦業保薦人期間盡職審查不足夠及未達標,罰款5,700萬元。

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https://hk.finance.appledaily.com/finance/realtime/article/20190314/59369537   記者:陳雪蕾


投行爭新股保薦 利潤少惟其後承銷油水多

新股上市集資「閒閒地」過億元,但背後為他們安排上市的投資銀行又有幾好賺?

一隻新股成功上市,投資銀行最少要花一年時間,保薦人的前期工作包括進行盡職審查(Due-Diligence,簡稱DD)、為客戶應付監管機構的多輪提問等,直至客戶獲監管機構批准上市,就到承銷部大展拳腳,為新股訂下招股價,向基金大戶銷售股份等,因此投行收取的費用可分為保薦費承銷佣金,前者佔整體上市開支約20%至25%,後者佔約30%。
投行人士大呻,近十年投行競爭激烈生意難做,尤其保薦新股風險極高,以往外資大行保薦大型新股上市,保薦費最少收100萬美元 (約780萬港元),但近年已大幅降價至500萬港元,「越大型嘅新股越低,因為個客會覺得投行在承銷佣金會搵好多。」而且「拆賬」方式改變,實際收到的保薦費會更低。去年上市的中國鐵塔(788),市傳其遴選保薦人中,有人以「零保薦費」搶刁。
不過投行不是善堂,不會做蝕本生意,積極爭取做新股保薦人,是為了在承銷團中取得話事權,確保有取得足夠股份銷售,因為投行在新股中最賺錢是靠承銷佣金,主板一般介乎1.5%至3.5%。同樣地,越大型的新股,佣金水平容易被客戶壓價,例如去年上市的小米(1810),其承銷佣金率僅1%,但承銷團仍袋走3.7億元佣金。
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http://www.quamnet.com/newscontent.action?articleId=3014792&view=NEWS
中金再生(773)案又多一人涉案被捕 涉嫌偽造帳目
13年7月31日

據媒體報導,遭香港證監會申請清盤及指涉嫌造假的中金再生(00773),傳其主席秦志威已聘請律師團與香港證監會對壘,同時昨日又再有多一人涉案被捕。而作為中金再生大股東的中國節能,其有持股的多隻股份昨日股價齊齊逆市下跌。


記者昨日于中金再生辦公室現場所見,仍有數名員工上班,都不願回應提問,對公司是否有人被捕三緘其口,昨日亦未見大股東兼主席秦志威的蹤影,但有自稱臨時清盤人的相關人士進入公司。
就中金再生案件,警方商罪科指,昨上午再拘捕一名37歲姓梁男子涉嫌偽造帳目而將被通宵扣查。警方商罪科在二十六日拘捕姓林男子及姓黎女子,消息指兩人分別為前公司秘書林寶基、秦志威妻子黎煥賢。目前被捕人士增至3人。
大股東關連股份逆市跌
秦志威持有的好運公司發聲明,反對香港證監會申請將公司清盤,認為不符股東利益,並已安排法律顧問跟進,但沒對香港證監會指控置評。
兩公司則發出「劃清界線」公告,中交建(01800)獲獨立非執董梁創順告知,其出任中金再生獨立非執董,路勁基建(01098)執董陳錦雄則為中金再生獨立非執董,兩公司皆表示,與中金再生無任何關連或業務關係。
此外,現持中金再生29%股權的國企中國節能環保集團,其同時持多家香港上市公司主要股權,有關公司昨逆市下跌,包括皆持股約29%的百宏(02299)及中國地能(08128),昨日雙雙跌逾2%,另持股54%的海東青(02228)沒升跌,持股5.1%的事安(00378)則涉收購而在停牌中。

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https://hk.finance.appledaily.com/finance/daily/article/20130813/18376363

2013年08月13     

秦志威到商罪科自首

證監會破天荒入稟中金再生(773)清盤踏入第三周,一直被指「下落不明」的集團主席秦志威終於「蒲頭」,消息指,秦志威昨在律師陪同下自行到商罪科「自首」,警方亦證實,昨午再拘捕1名47歲姓秦男子涉嫌偽造賬目,他將被通宵扣查,事件至今警方已一共拘捕4人。
證監會於上月27日申請中金再生清盤,並轉介商業罪案調查科,警方於上月先後拘捕秦志威妻子兼集團非執行董事黎煥賢、集團前公司秘書林寶基及財務董事兼副總裁馮嘉倫,但作為公司大股東秦志威一直未有現身解畫。昨日警方再發出新聞稿,確認昨午就相關偽造賬目案,再拘捕1名47歲姓秦男子涉嫌偽造賬目,該男子將被通宵扣查。
消息人士透露,昨日下午秦志威在律師陪同下自行到商罪科「自首」,早前市場一度傳出秦志威以「其他身份」離境。本報曾致電早前替秦志威向法庭申請介入參與將公司清盤的代表律師李勁冲,他表示對秦氏自首的事件不作評論,而證監會與港交所(388)對事件均不作評論。
證監會早前引用《證券及期貨條例》第212條,向原訟法庭提出呈請,將中金再生清盤,並委任保華顧問為臨時清盤人,證監表示,有證據指中金再生09年上市招股書及09年年報中,誇大公司的財務狀況、業務規模及主要附屬公司帶來的收益,其連續三年向主要供應商採購的金額絕大部份均屬虛構,更有證據顯示,公司目前仍然存在涉嫌誇大財政狀況的問題。

劉央每股1元沽中金再生

曾以「真的假不了,假的真不了」形容中金再生被清盤的劉央終投降,聯交所資料顯示,劉央上周二(8月6日)於場外減持442萬股中金再生,持股量由7.24%減持至6.87%,每股作價1元,套現442萬元,但其減持價較該股停牌前9.43元大幅折讓90%!
自中金再生被證監會入稟清盤後,市場已多次傳出有機構投資者以低至1元在場外沽貨,估不到其中一個居然是劉央。

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莊家操弄毐股:    生人勿近  散戶勿沾手

ASM 太平洋 (522)

Tuesday, March 12, 2019

2382 舜宇光學 2018 瑞聲 285 比亞迪電子 1478 丘鈦科技 698 通達 522 ASM Pacific 981 中芯 552 中國通訊服務 6088 鴻騰 763 中興通訊 992 聯想 1810 小米 與華為被美國封殺的不同命運

常有民笑稱現今世上最活躍的操弄股市大莊家就是無賴特朗普! 買了 Call 盤就在IG吹好風, 市彈升了就倉, 反手買了put 盤, 幾日後就出IG嚇嚇個市, 又可收割. 不時興起開大/細, 反復無常, 股民無法捉路, 如同開字花般假!

各山寨的財經演員, 莊家, 幫莊, 金融海盜之大行報告, 不時吹瘋手机設備股,  一時唱好, 一時狂踩, 炒作連連. 股民更應了解看透美國全力無休止封殺華為的政冶風險! 老美就算要推倒一個主權國政府亦常常成功做到, 更何況華為只是一家民營企業咋!

無賴特朗普慣常技倆是左手爪上擸物, 先咬上一口, 拖入阱陷中 再右手又爪實擸物就再咬深一大口; 當談判對手以為己讓足了步給美國就可達成協議簽約時, 特朗普會突反面強要咬更深不放. 再過一陣時間他又會推倒以前的協議要求更有利的! 無賴貪得無厭的本性! 當年無賴特朗普屢次破產就能屢次反而把他的債權銀拖入填債, 他便翻身反成巨富的無賴倆! 

現今美國國策, 分多路同時圍攻中國. 中美貿易談判迫簽喪權辱國不平等條約始其一; 再直接封殺華為, 除了控告華為偷美國技術外(請看下面video), 繼而會用總統行政命令, 禁止華為使用美國所有的軟硬件/芯片/零配件, 再者, 迫令台灣/韓國/日本/歐盟不准再向華為供應軟硬件/芯片/零配件 .... 這國策會對下列股份有何利(機遇)? 有何災害? 那些股份會劫難難逃? 華為的最先進7納米芯片正正是由TSMC台灣積體電路於台灣製造! 美國有強大政冶能力隨時迫台灣/韓國/日本/歐盟 ....等政府禁止其國家出口芯片/配件給華為 .... 全面封殺華為的直接和間接供應鏈   ......    這些股份, 誰會反而受益?  誰會受連累災劫?

2382 舜宇光學 (手机鏡頭)
2018 瑞聲  (手机聲響, 防水)
285 比亞迪電子   (手机金屬殼, 玻璃殼)
1478 丘鈦科技 (手机鏡頭)
698 通達集團 (手机配件)
522 ASM Pacific (荷蘭芯片封裝技術/設備/原配料)

 981 中芯 (有前台積電研發專家梁孟松加盟改做中芯)
6088 鴻騰六零八八精密科技 FIT HON TENG
763 中興通訊
992 聯想
1810 小米
552 中國通訊服務
光集團

TSMC台灣積體電路製造
中微導體設(上海)(尹志的芯片5納米刻蝕機)
大立光電股份有限公司
聯發科技 
鴻海 (組裝)
SAMSUNG 三星面板, 快閃記憶卡

請看片 Part A:
美國FBI 搜查華為於美國14個點的辦事處, 拿走一切電腦資料; 
FBI布錄音底與華為高層談話, 華為高層承認了曾把Adam Khan 的礸石玻璃送往中國, 違不准出境中國的協定 ....
偷T-Mobile ......

Part B:
華為供應鏈



Part C:
美國即將控告任正非華為, 這次不只是中興通訊咁簡單, 罰款及受美國就能保命, 而是結業才甘休的!



Part D:
2017年中國通過了 國家情報法全世界的民主國家都認定所有中國的通訊設備商, 通訊企業皆須向中共呈上一切情資及其大數據; 再加上中共強行於所有企業(包括民營企業) 全都須設黨支部, 所以, 全世界的民主國家都認定中國的通訊設備商, 通訊企業皆須向中呈上一切情資及其大數據 ......




財經演員, 莊家海盜的大行報告, 不時吹瘋手机設備股, 股民更應了解看透美國封殺的政冶風險極高!

莊家操弄毐股:    生人勿近  散戶勿沾手


ASM 太平洋 (522)





Sunday, March 10, 2019

朱太派金利豐董事朱俊浩黃潤權, 劉文德, 何志豪, 羅妙嫦入債仔公司, 有乜嘢冬瓜豆腐,可幫手度橋,亦隨時食埋隻殼」=藍鼎(582), 先施錶行(444), 昇捷控股(2340), 創業控股(2221), 遠東控股(036)、德泰新能源(559)、德普科技(3823)、創新電子(8346)及華人飲食(8272) ...

朱太金利豐董事朱俊浩黃潤權, 劉文德, 何志豪, 羅妙嫦債仔公司有乜嘢冬瓜豆腐可以幫手度橋隨時準備食埋隻殼」=藍鼎(582), 先施錶行(444), 昇捷控(2340), 創業控股(2221), 遠東控股(036)、德泰新能源(559)、德普科技(3823)、創新電子(8346)及華人飲食(8272) ...

https://hk.finance.appledaily.com/finance/daily/article/20190311/20630733

與債仔公司糾纏不清 派人任董事
金利豐經營模式受考驗



【蘋果日報財經專題, 記者:湯正巧】2018年10月,證監會法規執行部執行董事魏建新(Thomas Atkinson)一句「向邪惡集團(nefarious groups)宣戰」,預告2019年初行動,立時惹來市場風聲鶴唳。8.3.2019 證監會突搜查朱李月華旗下金利豐(1031)達五小時。朱太稱搜查不涉集團業務,但本報統計發現,金利豐疑與客戶關係密切,多名董事進入多家細股董事局,債主債仔關係糾纏不清,金利豐難獨善其身,或意味此經營模式已走到盡頭。
朱太上周四身在北京出席兩會,大批證監會人員突然搜查金利豐總部,將載有文件的紙箱及文件夾搬走。朱太及金利豐立即發放消息,指「搜查涉及客戶,與公司無關」。但本報統計發現,金利豐因其經營模式關係,委派了多名公司董事,包括朱太兒子朱俊浩(Kingston),兼任其他細股公司職務。朱太私下與部份細股老闆如曾失聯的藍鼎(582)主席仰智慧相熟,絕非單純的公司客仔關係。

財經界:方便查數 屬常態

朱氏一家各有職位,朱太丈夫朱沃裕為金利豐主席、朱太為先施錶行(444)主席,其子朱俊浩為昇捷控股(2340)主席。其中昇捷控股近日發盈警,涉商譽及前母公司新昌集團(404)應收款項減值,導致虧損大幅增加。

朱俊浩2016年擔任創業控股(2221)董事,但約一年後即辭任,該公司2018年7月曾因延遲披露業績停牌逾半年,直至今年2月中才補足業績復牌。根據中央結算紀錄(CCASS)發現,現時創業控股有56%股權仍存放在金利豐證券。此股多次轉型,股價大起大落。

金利豐董事黃潤權現擔任10家公司董事職務,包括遠東控股(036)、德泰新能源(559)、德普科技(3823)、昇捷控股等,金利豐均有大額持倉或曾協助其集資。其中德普科技沒披露在內地涉及訴訟,證監會認為其中期報告有重大失實、不完整或誤導資料,已被勒令停牌。

其他金利豐董事劉文德,擔任四家公司職務,包括創新電子(8346)及華人飲食(8272)。另外兩名董事何志豪及羅妙嫦,則擔任其他細股職務亦與金利豐千絲萬縷。

財經中人透露,債主委派人手入其他上市公司董事局,方便查數,是過往常態,「如果有乜嘢冬瓜豆腐可以幫手度橋,而且隨時準備食埋隻殼」。但隨着港交所收緊除牌要求,證監會亦加緊打擊不法行動,反映金利豐為首的證券行過去此等經營模式,或許已走到盡頭。
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金利豐(1031)行政總裁朱李月華被坊間稱為「殼后」持「揸莊股」市值276, 上月報章稱金利豐曾把蕭定一的 HMV數碼中國集團(8078)斬倉使HMV數碼中國股價狂插水. 回顧歷史, 金利豐正正是蕭若元的易還財務投資(8079)(前稱變靚D)和以前隻盈盛數碼(979)的屢次批股安排行, 屢次人頭戶接貨轉兜, 向下炒批股併股, 十幾次大手大手賤價批出街, 但最終公司控制權竟不動的把戲
繼中金早前篩選出66隻疑似『老千股 』名單, David Webb又列出50隻不能買的港股,李兆明在 雜誌i Money列出『老千股 』有路捉:-
(1) 經常不停地合股併股, 供股,
(2)
股價曾經跌過90%,
(3)
公司常改名,
(4)
業績醜樣.

清姐在fb, 上次她在某股票行金魚缸巡, 按按大利事機時, 聽到身旁有位師奶好叻, 她說『老千股 』除上列路數外還會:
(5)
公司從不派息,
(6)
蠱東及其家族多人支高薪, 大蠱東及其家族做董事, 家族食飯唱K, 遊埠遊船河, 汔車司機, 家族豪宅租金裝修管理水電煤費.....樣樣開公司數, 支乾間公司.

身旁另有一位阿姊更叻, 更直接, , 蕭若元d股仔就係啦! 當年蕭若元與周顯打莊打爆隻 "中國盛業集團(香港)有限公司(更名盈盛數碼世紀 PROSPER EVISION LIMITED)(979), (股東和董事有劉寶詠琴, 蕭漢森之子蕭永豐, 王海生, 余允抗)", 蕭若元與周顯打莊打爆, 一味向下炒, 3元插水九成, 拼股, 批股, 再拼股, 再批股, 再拼股, 賣盤批股, 拼股, 批股.... = 跌到何止骨都無, 渣都無. 其後佢家族隻易還財務投資8079 (前稱無限創意控股有限公司, 再前稱變靚D), 重施故技, 4毫子向下炒, 併股, 批股, 再向下炒, 再併股, 再批股, 再向下炒, 再併股, 再批股, 再向下炒, 再併股, 再批股, 再向下炒, 併股, 批股,向下炒, 併股, 批股, 再向下炒, 併股, 批股,....... .

她說, 見蕭若元不時放上youtube, 其大曬他用打莊炒股氹得的羊牯錢, 帶著肥頭大耳的女兒豪華旅遊的片段, 真叫股民嘔心! 嘔呀!